Japan: Still a Civilian Power

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After World War II, Japan adopted a Peace Constitution with its Article 9 interpreted as legally banning the use of armed force for settling international disputes. Under this constitution, Japan began to pursue non-violent approaches to its defense policy with reliance on the United States.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as the attack of September 11, 2001 in New York changed the international landscape dramatically. Under such circumstances, Japan’s military forces, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) participated in the coalition led by the United States in the 2003 Iraq War. In 2007, the Defense Agency changed its name to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). At the same time, international peace cooperation activities, which had been originally supplementary missions, became the primary activity of the SDF, whose role since then has diversified in response to emerging new threats and a wide variety of situations.

This March, two Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) destroyers left Japan for an anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia. In the process of this decision-making, the protection of foreign vessels and the use of weapons had been discussed. The Japanese government based the MSDF dispatch on the existing maritime securities operations framework under the SDF law. However, this law restricts MSDF members to protect only Japanese ships and those carrying Japanese nationals or cargo, and to use their weapons only in self-defense or in acts of necessity. Last month, Hillary Clinton, in Tokyo on her first overseas trip as Secretary of State, asked the Defense Minister, Yasukazu Hamada to allow the MSDF to protect all foreign vessels in an emergency.

On her request, the Japanese Cabinet approved a bill “concerning punishment and measures against piracy,” which would enable MSDF personnel to protect all vessels. After the Diet passes this new anti-piracy law, it will be used as the basis for the MSDF dispatch off Somalia. However, because of Japan’s pacifist constitution and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the largest opposition party, which does not support this bill, it is unclear how Diet deliberations will fare concerning this legislation. That is why the duration of the MSDF mission within the maritime securities operations framework is limited until the Defense Minister issues a new order.

From this, two issues arise; one is pressure, rather than a simple request from the United States and the other is the legality and efficacy of the use of force in international situations. Both have always been the main issues
in the arguments concerning the dispatch of the SDF abroad.

The 1991 Gulf War was a watershed in the history of post-war Japanese debates on defense and national security, as well as the flight of the Taep’odong missile over Japanese territory in August 1998.

In my presentation, I will attempt to argue that by illustrating the evolution of Japan’s recent security practices and by examining its security identity, there is a possibility of EU-Japan cooperation in the area of international security.

1 The Evolution of Japan’s Security Policy

In terms of Japanese security practices, a series of shifts in its policy present a contrast between a hamstrung Diet unable to dispatch troops for the 1991 Iraq War, and the SDF participation in the coalition led by the United States in the 2003 Iraq War. By that time, the SDF had been dispatched to fourteen countries or areas. Now, nearly 30,000 SDF members are engaged in twenty international peace cooperation activities.

The involvement of the SDF in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO) in the post-September 11 period, including its first participation in an active combat operation (though not in an active military role) in 1992—first the Maritime Self-Defense Forces in the Indian Ocean in support of the U.S.-led coalition operations in Afghanistan in late 2001, and next the three combined services in support of the U.S. operations in Iraq in 2004. So-called emergency legislation was passed to allow the SDF to operate domestically under a legal framework in times of conflict. It also has expanded its defense cooperation and training with the U.S. military in other areas, reflected in new defense guidelines issued in 1997 and other areas of increased cooperation in response to the global war on terrorism. New agreements with the United States further integrated the capabilities and interoperability of military forces of both states. Japan’s military capabilities and future weapons development also expanded in this period.

Perhaps the most dramatic event has been the fact that the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was elevated to a ministry, the Ministry of Defense, in January 2007. We have to remember that during the first few months of the Persian Gulf Crisis, the then-Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu excluded the JDA from all Cabinet deliberations in order to prevent civilian decision-making from becoming contaminated by the views of professional military leaders.

There is no doubt that both the tone of the discussions and the content of Japan’s security policies have shifted considerably since the Cold War and early post-Cold War periods. Shortly after the North Korean Taep’odong’s missile flight over Japanese territory in August 1998, a series of policy outcomes were enacted: plans to develop missile defense and surveillance satellites, relax arms export restrictions; legislation, enacting some controversial aspects of the 1977-revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines; and establishing constitutional research commissions in both houses of the Diet so as to devise concrete proposals for possible revision of Article 9 and other limits.
on Japanese military activities.

Moreover, a number of pieces of domestic legislation, suggesting an increasing acceptance of symbols and actions of the state, were also passed after years of debate, including legalizing the long-controversial national anthem (Kimigayo) and national flag (Hinomaru), requiring them to be utilized in schools, and the approval of wiretapping to be carried out by the national police agency (NPA)—sparkling off concerns at home and abroad over a rising nationalism in Japan.

a) The Gulf War As a Watershed

After the end of World War II, the Japanese government established and pursued a fundamental national doctrine of maintaining the Japan-US security alliance and gaining economic prosperity under the Peace Constitution. In other words, Japan adopted and pursued the so-called "Yoshida Doctrine," which is referred to as the cheap ride of democratic Japan after 1945 in Richard Samuels’ book.\(^3\) Since then, for a half century, this so-called doctrine has been underpinned by the three embedded values of; 1) pacifism, 2) nuclear allergy, and 3) 'defensive-defense doctrine.'\(^3\)

Just shortly after the end of the Cold War, it was quite natural for Japan and the U.S. to sum up such a new key role of Japan-U.S. alliance relationship as a credible deterrent to unspecified threats, because basically no major military threat to the Japan-U.S. alliance had clearly emerged up till then. Prime Minister Kaifu envisioned, at that time, that Japan would assume a more active global role as a non-military, civilian power concentrating on economic and environmental issues.

In August 1990, Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent military confrontation between the United States and Iraq came as a complete surprise to Japan, which was, then, heavily dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf and therefore, came under great pressure from the United States. Kaifu, however, was less inclined to take an active role in the crisis. Public opinion showed that most Japanese preferred diplomatic negotiations and economic sanctions to the use of arms. American analysts have frequently argued that the Japanese behavior in the Persian Gulf Crisis had to be understood as an extension of its traditional strategy of free-riding on international security orders, created by the United States during the Cold War.

The Japanese government began to build up a domestic political consensus for a more active role in international security affairs. In order to clear the humiliation of being regarded as “a free-riding Japan,” Kaifu, encouraged by public opinion, attempted to rally parliamentary support so as to pass a law, permitting non-military SDF missions abroad. After the Gulf War, Japan started participating in UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions though most Japanese remained highly ambivalent about the use of force in foreign policy. According to a December 1993 survey, only 26% of the Japanese respondents indicated that the use of force in the maintenance of international justice and order was an appropriate measure.
b) The Impact of the Taep’odong Missile Flight over Japan

On August 31, 1998, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched a missile, Taep’odong I, over the main Japanese island of Honshu, which then splashed down into the Pacific Ocean. Although the missile was tracked by a Japanese Aegis destroyer, the flight reinforced the perception that Japan would be defenseless in a ballistic missile attack, leading to new perceptions such as the deployment of domestically-controlled surveillance satellites and the development of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system.

Undoubtedly, the North Korean action was a provocation against Japan, particularly because of its launch, without prior notification, in the direction of the sea surrounding Japan, where there was heavy sea traffic and many fishing boats. Furthermore, the missile flew in air space, where there was equally heavy traffic and this naturally posed a problem judging from the basic principles of safety, according to the International Civil Aviation Treaty.

Just one week later, the Japanese government and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) “liaison council” began to investigate the option of acquiring multi-purpose satellites. And the newly-established Government Committee for the Promotion of the Introduction of Reconnaissance Satellites (whose Chairman was the Chief Cabinet Minister) decided to request the Ministry of Finance for 80 billion yen ($800 million) as the budget for FY2000 so as to develop and construct ground-based facilities, and train operational experts necessary for the introduction of reconnaissance satellites. The government also proposed to put four of these into operation from FY2002.

At the same time, the Defense Agency (now the MOD), too, decided to request 2.1 billion yen ($21 million) as the budget for the BMD system. Currently, the Japanese government has, in FY2008, allocated approximately 113 billion yen ($11.3 billion) for BMD-related defense spending. The Japanese government concluded an agreement of co-research and co-development of BMD with the U.S. government in 2003, as it was the only foreign participant in this massively complex and expensive undertaking, one that absorbed more than 2 % of the Japanese defense budget in 2004. The launches, without prior notification of Taep’odong I in 1998 and Taep’odong II in July 2006 by the DPRK, had largely contributed to this fivefold increase in BMD-related spending in Japan and the deployment of reconnaissance satellites as well.5

Apart from this, most Japanese perceived that their country was being coerced by the DPRK, and since the 1998 missile tests the Japanese public has come to accept the fact that war is an ever-present possibility even for a civilian power. And this awareness has provided the grounds, on which the issue of constitutional revision and even nuclearization are debated.6

2 Strengthening Japan–US Security Ties

Throughout the Cold War, Japan was the only country that had adopted a Peace Constitution with its famous Article 9 interpreted as
legally banning the use of armed force in the
defense of national objectives. Its professional
military had little public standing and was un-
der the thumb of civilians, with its grand
strategy aimed at gaining prestige as a civil-
ian power.

To be sure, since the 1970s the U.S. govern-
ment has persistently pressured Japan to play
a larger regional role in Asia and to spend
more of its rapidly growing GDP on national
defense. However, Japan has made no more
than marginal concessions. On security issues,
it has kept a low regional profile, and since
the 1980s Japanese defense spending has con-
sistently stayed below 1 percent of its GDP.
After the end of the Cold War, the United
States no longer had any multilateral security
structure in North-East Asia. Therefore, the
Japanese government was forced to rearrange
its own defense and security policies in a do-
mestic context.

a) A New Defense Guideline and Missile
Defense

In the meantime, the U.S. Department of
Defense published a Security Strategy Docu-
ment (the so-called Nye Report) in 1995 for
the redefinition of the alliance relationship be-
tween the U.S. and Japan. In this report, the
need was stressed to redefine the significance
of the U.S.-Japan security alliance in order to
meet jointly the new challenges in the area,
continue to pursue the forward defense pos-
ture in the region, and to maintain the pres-
ence of significant numbers of U.S. troops:
47,000 in Japan. The Nye Report officially re-
versed the trend towards lower troop levels
in the immediate post-Cold War period and
set the U.S. on a course towards seeking and
consolidating military accessibility in South-
East Asia, and expanding the range of mili-
tary activity covered by the U.S.-Japan Secu-
rit y Treaty

As a result of many years of very extensive
consultations, both governments finally pub-
lished a joint document, placing an emphasis
on the continuous significance of an alliance
relationship between both states, and in April
1996, “The U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Se-
curity,” was issued by President Clinton and
Prime Minister Hashimoto.

Japan finally chose to continue to pursue
the maintenance and strengthening of U.S.-Ja-
pan security ties. Without any strong objec-
tions from opposition parties, the Defense
Guideline-related Bills passed in the Japanese
Diet on May 24, 1999 and took effect on May
28. The package included three bills authoriz-
ing the JSDF to take various measures in
times of emergencies in areas surrounding
the territory of Japan, to amend the Self De-
fense Law, and to revise the Japan-U.S. Acqui-
sition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).

During the discussions of these bills and af-
ner their enactment, several Japanese com-
mentators expressed the view that the new
guideline and its related laws would be sub-
stantially equivalent to the revision of the Ja-
pan-U.S. Security Treaty in the sense that Ja-
pan would be expanding its military activities,
even if it were only logistical support, in order
to reinforce U.S. military commitments in oth-
er parts of the regions. These laws ensured
very substantial changes in U.S.-Japan alliance relations from bilateral to global security ties and far beyond the spirit and political constraints of the Japanese Constitution.

Japan’s post-war strategic posture based on as it were the “embedded defensive-defense doctrine” has been deeply interconnected with the nation’s “no more war” sentiment, namely with Japan’s embedded nature of pacifism. However, it should be noted that those, who felt this re-alignment of the U.S.-Japan security relationship in line with post-Cold War circumstances as war-prone trends in Japan, had become a minority by that time, especially after the missile test launch by the DPRK on August 31, 1998. This was clearly seen in some public opinion polls, in which over half of the Japanese supported the Defense Guideline-related Bills.

Contrary to such pacifist criticism, many commentators and politicians who fervently stressed more international contributions by Japan in the area of peace and stability missions in the military field, insisted enthusiastically on the development and deployment of reconnaissance satellites and the facilitation of a co-research and co-deployment program with the U.S. for the future deployment of the BMD system.

b) Relaxing Arms Exports and the Military Use of Outer Space

Japan refrains from pursuing most offensive military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, though it has the technology and finance to do so. Despite possessing one of the world’s most advanced manufacturing bases, which produces the majority of weapons for Japan’s own SDF, Japanese firms export no weapons abroad. Further, despite adhering to a “defensive-defense” military posture, Japan’s stated policy regarding the use of outer space has precluded—until very recently—the use of military surveillance satellites so as to balance its lack of offensive weapons capability, and even today its intelligence capabilities are quite limited and its activities highly constrained.

The acceptance of the MD system caused Japan to relax the arms export restrictions and to open up the way for the military use of outer space. In 2008, there were some policy changes concerning the export of arms and the military use of outer space.

Arms Export

The export of arms and military technology has been banned since 1967, when Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared the Three Principles on Arms Export, which prohibited their export to the following countries: 1) Communist-bloc countries; 2) countries to which the export of arms is prohibited under United Nations resolutions; 3) countries which are actually involved or likely to become involved in international conflicts.

In 1976, the ban was strengthened. The then-Prime Minister Takeo Miki, who was known as a dove on security issues within the LDP, announced a new government policy guideline, which maintained the specific prohibitions on arms exports to the three aforementioned categories of states, and added a blanket prohibition on these, stating that “arms exports to other areas shall be avoided,
in conformity with the spirit of the Japanese Constitution and the Foreign Exchange Control Law." Moreover, it adds "exports of arms production-related equipment...shall be dealt with in the same manner as arms." The ban was reinforced in 1981 when both houses of Parliament passed resolutions supporting it.

The United States did not advocate the repeal of Japan's new blanket arms export ban but instead argued for exemptions for technology transfer only to be made in favor of the United States. In addition to American pressure, there were demands from Japanese industries for a change in Japan's arms export policy. These three new principles on arms export was jeopardized by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, who as a hawk on security issues, sought to relax them. In January 1983, the Japanese government issued new policy guidelines related to arms exports that allowed the transfer of technology to the United States. In November of the same year, the Military Technology Transfer Agreement was signed jointly by both Japan and the U.S.

In December 2004, weapons component transfers related to MD were allowed for the United States, which further reduced the restrictions imposed by Japan. In January 2008, the Japanese government announced that it would consider returning to the 1967 Three Principles on Arms Exports from that of the 1976 agreement. The combination of exceptions for dual use and for the United States will undoubtedly allow for increased Japanese participation in weapons exports in the future.

The Military Use of Outer Space
Japan's peaceful-use-of-space policy, which was adopted by a 1969 Diet resolution, is just one example of Japan's pacifist or anti-militarist foreign policy. Unlike the case of arms export restrictions, however, the limiting of the use of outer space to peaceful purposes had little practical effect on Japan's outer space development in the short term because it did not possess competitive technology in that field as it did in the area of arms manufacturing. The Peaceful Use of Space resolution was not directed only at the potential development of surveillance satellites, but this use of space was one of the primary concerns of those opposed to its militarization. The Diet resolution presented an institutionalized barrier to Japanese corporate and military use of space, rooted in the security identity of domestic anti-militarism.

Only after the 1985 Plaza Accord-generated exchange rate revaluations greatly increased the wealth of Japanese companies, and Japanese technology had risen to a level competitive with that of the United States on many levels, did the Japanese government and industry leaders seriously consider the industrial development of outer space.

By the mid-1980s, Japanese firms had become convinced that successful development of space-related technology would be imperative for the twenty-first century.

After the test launch by the DPRK, as mentioned above, the government and the LDP immediately decided to introduce reconnaissance satellites and the Government Committee for the Promotion of the Introduction of Reconnaissance Satellites was established anew.

In December 1998, the government decided
to use outer space for military intelligence purposes with the intention of developing a network of domestically-produced and deployed information-gathering satellites to be utilized by the JDA and the SDF in response to new security threats.

As far as the installation of these satellites is concerned, most politicians except for the Communists and the Social Democrats, have supported the legitimization and institutionalization of these systems in the general framework of Japan’s defense posture. In May 2008, they proposed to revise fundamentally the “Diet Resolution Relating to the Peaceful Use of Outer Space,” adopted in 1969 which, at that time, banned the military use of outer space. It was decided to enact a new law in order to monitor missile launches and keep reconnaissance satellites in outer space.

This bill finally passed on May 21, 2008, which stipulated that the use and development of space be carried out in ways that would contribute to Japan’s security. This shows clearly a change in Japan’s basic policy on the peaceful use of space from a “non-military” to a “non-aggressive” stance. This law also permitted the government to station equipment in outer space compatible with a “defensive-defense” purpose.

Throughout, Japan and the U.S. have often raised their anxieties about China’s ambitious attempts to expand its military activities in space. In 2006, the first launch of a Chinese manned satellite and a test launch of an anti-satellite missile by its military with its success in January 2007, illustrate a rising perceived threat and a sense of insecurity towards the PRC by both the U.S. and Japan. The then-Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates’ statement, submitted to the Senate Appropriations Committee on May 20, 2008, shows very well this perceived threat in the US preponderant system of space weaponry posed by China:

The Defense Department’s heavy reliance on space capability is clear to potential adversaries, some of whom are now developing anti-satellite weapons. Protecting our assets in space is, therefore, a high priority. In the past, the Department has been slow to address this vulnerability, but we are now addressing this problem properly.

It goes without saying that Japan’s military use of outer space is closely connected with the space policy of the U.S. China has perceived this new security rearrangement between the U.S. and Japan as offensive rather than defensive, which has caused a security dilemma in North-East Asia.

3 Thinking of Japan’s Security Policy

a) Analyzing Japan’s Security Practice

For the past several years, many books on Japan’s recent security policy have been published abroad. In Rethinking Japanese Security, P.J.Katzenstein writes that:

Fifteen years ago, only area specialists were thinking about the question of Japanese security, and those questions were narrowly framed. A more fully theorized approach to
Japanese security has become more widely accepted. It has opened new analytical vistas that may encourage an exploration of new political possibilities at the very time that a more assertive and less certain Japan seeking to recalibrate its politics in a changing world.

Among them, I sympathize with Andrew L. Oros, in his *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Here, he sweeps away the fear that Japan is on the verge of a major break from the past sixty years of peaceful security practice or that it is being ”normalized” into developing military capabilities and approaches in line with its great power status, with a careful examination of how security practices have evolved from the constructivist’s point of view. He writes that:

Japanese military forces are still focused in Japan’s self-defense, still don’t engage in combat activities abroad (even under UNPKO), and still face enormous obstacles to their actual deployment. Japan still refrains from exporting weapons or developing nuclear weapons. The new Ministry of Defense still lacks the resources to develop a national strategy beyond short-term targets (despite renewed interest and efforts to do so) and has seen its budget actually decline in recent years despite a rebounding economy.

More broadly, despite increasing security awareness among the Japanese public and elites, increased evidence of strategic thinking and planning, and a broader scope of debate of once-taboo subjects, much debate is still consumed with legalistic questions (・・・) Finally, any action on revising the linchpin of Japan’s postwar security identity—Article 9 of the postwar constitution—has now been foreclosed until 2010 at the earliest, and even then serious hurdles remain.

On the other hand, Richard J. Samuels in *Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*, illustrates how successful Japanese leaders have been in the past in adapting a limited number of ideas and strategic concepts in mastering broad range international conditions and predicts Japan’s new grand strategy, which he calls the “Goldilocks consensus,” that will follow Meiji Japan’s “Rich Nations, Strong Army,” Konoe’s “New Order,” and the “Yoshida Doctrine.” This consensus is ”not too hard but not too soft, not too Asian and not too Western and neither too dependent on the United States nor too vulnerable to China.”

Samuels suggests the possibility that Japan will run away from the United States’ control, seeking the twin rewards of autonomy and prestige. It is hard for me to imagine this. As Samuels suggests, the Japanese government has pursued consistently one of the basic principles of the “Yoshida Doctrine” namely, if anything, the inherently basic line for dependence on the U.S. in both politico-military and economic terms. It is no exaggeration to say that the post-war Japanese grand strategy is affirmatively characterized as “America First” and “Asia Second.” Therefore, Japan, as a regional core state, is expected to play a crucial role in linking Asia to the U.S. in the
near future. Numerous scholars and analysts have already demonstrated the reasons why Japan will not, once again, become a great rival multi-power in East Asia. Researches on how to build a future security community in East Asia are abundant. Therefore, I dare to refer to an EU-Japan security cooperation. Europe is, at best, the third in Japan’s order of priority in terms of security matters.

b) Thinking of the Future of a Japan-EU Security Cooperation

During the Cold War, the European Community and Japan kept a low profile as far as security was concerned. Both were considered civilian powers that had in common the use of non-military means for addressing security interests. In the 1990s, the European security strategy and the Japanese security initiatives had a common ground, which was a human security approach.

As mentioned before, after the Gulf War, Japan began to participate in the UN PKO and assisted in the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo. The key factor for its participation was "human security." The Japanese government’s stance has been favorable to such a concept since 1998, when at that time the Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi promoted it. The reasons why the Japanese government adopted this human security concept were that first, it matched the liberal and "pacifist" public opinion of the Japanese people and therefore, it was easy to get public support for any Japanese contribution to the world human security agenda; and second, it was a reasonable and logical continuation of the comprehensive security doctrine developed by Japanese politicians and scholars in the 1970s.

Since the Kosovo crisis of 1999, the EU has actively conducted a policy aimed at building independent crisis management forces that would not depend on the US or NATO, which included both civilian and military components.

Since 1991, when Japan and the EC signed the Hague Declaration, of which its main principle and goals were mutual cooperation in the area of security, security relations between both regions have been developing gradually. Both highlighted and stressed the significance of the following spheres of security cooperation: 1) environment; 2) energy; 3) science and technology; 4) development assistance; 5) conflict prevention and non-military crisis management. These areas are common points that could be developed in the future as a core of a European Union-Japan security partnership.

The Japan-EU security relationship is not purely bilateral and involves cooperation with other multilateral structures, such as the UN, Asia Europe Meetings (ASEM), ARF, etc. Their concerns about security for one another’s regions and the necessity for cooperating within multilateral structures can become features of a Japan-EU security relationship.

4 Japan is still a Civilian Power

Most Japanese are not keen to depart dramatically from policies, which have successful-
ly prevented a single Japanese soldier from being killed in combat for over sixty years. I remember it was expected that the SDF would withdraw from the coalition led by the U.S. if even one Japanese soldier were to be killed in the 2003 Iraq War. Hence, the Japanese government will always make its security policy reflect public opinion.

Japan is still a civilian power. We cannot forget that it has not yet abandoned the embedded "defensive-defense doctrine" in its own grand strategy, and that it has, therefore, pursued its own way of national security as a faithful and subordinate partner of the U.S.'s grand strategy. We, Japanese, need to understand that civilian power is only viable in the shadow of U.S. pressure, domination, and military power. As far as the autonomy and the prestige are concerned as Samuels points out, I, myself, have not yet seen an outstanding statesman (Jpn. genkun) similar to the Meiji leaders such as Saigo, Okubo, and Kido. As time goes by, both the spirit and nature of the Japanese people are changing. As Oros notes, "it is essential to have one's view of Japan's future on its enduring security identity, and ultimately, on Japanese citizens themselves—a people who have come to see their way of providing for society as sufficiently "normal" to last well into this new century."12

Notes
1 This paper was prepared for the presentation at the Security Working Group, EUI Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies on March 24, 2009.
4 Takehiko Yamamoto, *Building a Security Community in East Asia and Japan's Dilemma between Bilateralism and Multilateralism*, the delivered paper at the Panel on Building a New Paradigm of International Studies Committee (WISC), University of Ljubljana, Slovenia on July 24, 2008, p.18.
5 Ibid., p.12.
6 Peter J. Katzenstein
7 Yamamoto, *op.cit.*, p.11.
8 Andrew L. Oros,
9 Katzenstein, *op.cit.*, p.25.
10 Oros, *op.cit.*, p.171.